Vayikro
Book 3: Leviticus

Chapter 21 - Text Notes

1 Why such an emphasis on the word "say"? Ordinarily, when the Torah begins a paroshoh with the phrase "Speak...say," the word "speak" refers to a general call, while "say" refers to the details. Here however we have the word "say" twice (M.).

2 To keep them from becoming ritually impure; Yevomos 114a. There is however a dispute regarding the extent to which this is to be taken. Is a father or court (in the absence of a father) required to keep the minor from all impurity, or are they merely forbidden to cause impurity to the minor, either by command or action (M.L.).

3 That is, those unfit for the Kehunah by birth or because they have contracted a forbidden marriage are also included in the following prohibition?

4 Even though they are forbidden to carry out the Temple service.

5 That is, they are included in the following prohibition.

6 Sifra Emor, par. 1, 1. While ordinarily the use of a masculine noun or verb does not necessarily exclude women, as for example, all prohibitions apply equally to men and women (aside from those which women are physically incapable of keeping), here, since verse 6 states: "for it is the fire-offerings of Ad-noy...that they bring," which implies that the prohibitions in this section apply to those who have the right to serve in the Temple---which excludes women kohanos (Tz.L.).

7 Literally, "a dead body [which it is] a mitzvoh [to bury]." Because there is no one else who can occupy themselves with the burial but the kohein, he is permitted to come into contact with the dead body and bury it; he is only forbidden such contact "among his people," when people are available to bury the dead. Sifra Emor, par. 1, 2.

8 Sifra Emor, par. 1, 4; Yevomos 22b. That is, the word " {Hebrew Ref} " here refers to his wife, but not ordinarily; the word really means "flesh" and when used in a familial sense does not necessarily refer to his wife. That is why the adjective which follows is the masculine {Hebrew Ref} rather than the feminine {Hebrew Ref} (M., G.A.).

9 Sifra Emor, par. 1, 12, Yevomos 60a. Thus, she is still closely enough related to him for him to defile himself by attending her funeral. This is in contrast to the kohein's own betrothed wife-to-be, for whom he is still forbidden to defile himself. Note that the word "related" ( {Hebrew Ref} ) is feminine in regard to his sister, while, as noted above, is masculine in regard to his wife; thus, we include his engaged sister, but exclude his own financee, who is not yet "related" (M., G.A.).

10 Literally, "who has not yet been a man's." That is, as noted, she is betrothed, but has not yet entered into marital relations with him.

11 Sifra Emor, par. 1, 12, Zevochim 100a. Since the verse repeats this phrase for emphasis, we learn that it is not merely permitted, but required. Moreover, if he is required to defile himself in order to take part in his sister's funeral, he is certainly required to do so for the other relations mentioned---his father and mother, his wife, son and daughter, and brother (M.L.).

12 Such as a divorcee married to an ordinary kohein, or a widow to a Kohein G-dol,

13 That is, he becomes a cholol.

14 Illegitimately married to him.

15 That is, his wife.

16 Since there are non-kohanim to do so, as above in verse 1.

17 To forbid him to cause impurity to himself by attending to her burial.

18 See Sifra Emor, par. 1, 15, Yevomos 90b.

19 Non-Jews used to do this as a sign of mourning.

20 I.e., non-kohanim.

21 In Devorim 14, 1. Thus, if non-kohanim were prohibited such behavior, it goes without saying that kohanim are prohibited, since they have to maintain a higher standard of holiness, and are subject to a larger number of prohibitions than ordinary Israelites (L.B.).

22 That is, on the upper forepart of the head, above the hairline, where the {Hebrew Ref} are placed.

23 Devorim 14, 1.

24 In Devorim 14, 1.

25 Thus, each verse comes to teach us something we would not otherwise know, and both are necessary; Makkos 20b.

26 Again, referring to a non-kohein.

27 In 19, 27 above.

28 For a sin-offering if done unintentionally or lashes if done intentionally.

29 In our verse.

30 Makkos 21a. That is, only a shaving with a razor fulfills the requirements of these two verses---"shaving" and "destroying" the beard. As to the places which are prohibited to be shaved, see Rashi and notes to 19, 27 above.

31 Again, a non-kohein is meant.

32 Vayikro 19, 28 above.

33 And only kohanim, who are held to a higher standard of holiness are liable for each and every gash? (M., G.A.)

34 Here, in regard to kohanim the expression implies that a kohein is liable for each and every gash. This also applies to an ordinary Israelite, despite the fewer number of restrictions on him, because of a gezeroh shovoh which Sifra makes between the word "gash" here and in 19, 28, thus applying the liability expressed here to the prohibition on ordinary Israelites in chapter 19. Rashi relies on the gezeroh shovoh he cited above to show what is intended (M., G.A.).

35 Sifra Emor, per. 1, 4, Makkos 20b. The Hebrew expression translated as "to make a gash" really means "to gash a gash," and so, strictly speaking, there is no need for the second word "gash" in the verse, since we already know the prohibition from the first word, the verb. Therefore, its presence must come to tell us something we would not otherwise know---that a person is liable for each and every separate gash he makes.

36 Sifra Emor, per. 1, 6. That is, if a kohein wishes to violate one of these prohibitions, as for example by attending a funeral of one who is not a close relative (as explained in verses 2--4), the court must prevent him from doing so even by force. Various reasons are given for this midrashic interpretation. M. suggests that this is derived from the use of the word "they shall be" ( {Hebrew Ref} ) which implies force; otherwise, "they are" ( {Hebrew Ref} ) would be sufficient. G.A. points out that if this were not the meaning of the verse, it would be superfluous, since it seems merely to restate what has already been said in verses 1--4. Therefore, it must come to inform us that he must be sanctified even against his will.

37 See Sifra Emor, per. 1, 7, Yevomos 61b.

38 Dying in his fifties without surviving offspring.

39 That is, one whom she is forbidden to marry or have incestuous relations with, under penalty of koreis, as set forth above in chapter 19, such as a brother or son.

40 A Giveonite who is forbidden to intermarry with Jews, even though they were assigned lowly tasks in the Temple (see Yehoshua 10). The word {Hebrew Ref} means "given over," because they were assigned such work, as drawing water or hewing wood (I.S.).

41 That is, the offspring of forbidden marriages which is be punishable by death or Koreis. However, marriage with a mamzer is punishable by lashes and not death, and for this reason there is a dispute among the Rishonim as to whether such a marriage makes the non-mamzer partner a cholol or chaloloh. According to Rashi and the Rambam, it does, while according to the Ramban and Tosafos, only an illegal, incestuous marriage which involves koreis makes the spouse a cholol or chaloloh (see Ramban, M., G.A., D.H. and L.B.).

42 For example, if a widow (legally) marries an ordinary kohein who subsequently dies, and she then (illegally) marries a Kohein G-dol, she becomes a chaloloh, and may no longer marry even an ordinary kohein. Moreover, tke Kohein G-dol eventually trangresses several {Hebrew Ref} by remaining with her---the issurin of marrying a widow and a chaloloh , and, in addition, according to some views, likewise a zonoh (D.H.).

43 Sifra Emor, per. 1, 13, Yevomos 88b. This enforced holiness refers specifically to forbidden marriages, while the one above (in verse 6) refers to becoming ritually unclean through contact with the dead (L.B., see D.D.); M. and G.A. distinguish between these two differently: verse 6 refers to persuasion by argument, while our verse refers to the court's sentencing him to lashes---not for the illegal marriage---but to encourage him to divorce his wife willingly, since a man cannot be forced to divorce his wife against his will.

44 Such as being called up first to the reading of the Torah.

45 I.e., to lead the {Hebrew Ref} ; see Rashi on Nedorim 62b.

46 That is, even when she is only betrothed, and not yet married, as Rashi proceeds to explain.

47 That is, as long as the couple have not gone under the {Hebrew Ref} , the "bridal canopy." Even though the marriage is not considered consumated under Rabbinic law, it is by Torah law, and so a woman who is betrothed, having a marriage contract prepared and witnessed, is considered has having committed adultery if she has relations with a man other than her betrothed. An ordinary woman in such a situation is liable to death by strangulation (see 19, 10 above). However, a kohein's daughter is liable to a more severe penalty, as the verse specifies.

48 According to R. Akiva, this does not include a kohein 's betrothed daughter, only a {Hebrew Ref} , a married daughter while according to R. Yishmo'el it includes even an {Hebrew Ref} , a betrothed daughter (G.A.).

49 That is, a kohein's daughter who is single who goes astray is not liable to this more severe penalty; see Sanhedrin 51b.

50 Sanhedrin 52a.

51 Sanhedrin 22b, where this is derived from the measure of a {Hebrew Ref} by means of a gezeroh shovoh, since the expression "growing wild" is used there (Bemidbor 6, 5). A {Hebrew Ref} is forbidden to cut his hair until his period of nezirus is over---and the standard period is thirty days, as derived in Nozir 5b.

52 A person who enters a tent---or a roofed-over area, or even an overhang of tree branches---under which a dead body (or grave) lies becomes ritually impure (Mishnah Oholos 15, 10). This applies to any roof-over structure, or even a person bending over a dead body; the term "tent" to express this idea comes from Bemidbor 19, 14, "If a man dies in a tent...." Rashi derives this from the word "enter"---which implies entering a covered-over area. Accordingly, Rashi would translate our verse as: "And adjacent to any dead body he shall not enter [a tent]." The word "al" can mean "adjacent" as well as "on"---as witness its use in Bemidbor 2, 20 (M.).

53 Since the blood is actually identified with the "soul" in 17, 11 above.

54 Approximately three-and-a-third to something more than seven ounces, which is the minimum amount of blood required to sustain life, halachically speaking.

55 Which is considered equivalent to a dead body in causing impurity.

56 As explained above.

57 Literally, "a dead body [whose burial is a] mitzvoh [for anyone who comes upon it]." The source for Rashi is Sifra Emor, per. 2, 4, Nozir 47b. Since there is no one else available to bury it; see verse 1 above. The reason for this {Hebrew Ref} is the redundancy of the prohibition implicit in this verse, since "his father and his mother" are included in the expression "every dead body" of the first half of the verse, and so it is taken to refer to a {Hebrew Ref} (G.A.). Note that the permission to bury such a dead body, which Rashi notes in his comments to verse 1 refers to an ordinary kohein, while this verse refers to a Kohein G-dol (see L.B.).

58 Or, more precisely, the bier, since at some times coffins were not used; Rashi's source is Sanhedrin 18a.

59 That is, a mourner who is responsible for the burial of the deceased and is yet before that burial has taken place.

60 That is, he does not profane the service he performs.

61 Zevochim 16a, Sanhedrin 84a.

62 Kiddushin 77a.

63 Literally, "the rule."

64 Ibid. And the laws set forth in this chapter do not apply to his sons by her.

65 Doniel 5, 1.

66 Malochi 1, 8. This verse seems totally redundant, since the verse before already laid down the rule that a kohein with a blemish may not "approach to offer the bread of his G-d." Why then repeat "for any man who has a blemish shall not approach"? It cannot be because of the word ki, "because" since it does not state any more than the previous half-verse. Thus, Rashi explains the seeming redundancy as providing a rationale for this prohibition. Since even a human governor must be shown respect by being served by those without blemish, all the more so G-d (G.A.).

67 He does so for medicinal purposes. Sifra Emor, per. 3, 8; Mishnah Bechoros 7, 8.

68 This translation follows the interpretation of M.L.; others translate: "one eye is large, and one eye is small," but the blemish is not one of absolute but rather of relative size. Paired organs must be of equal size.

69 Bechoros 40b.

70 Referring to the eyebrows; the hair of the eyebrows is long.

71 Bechoros 43b; Rashi there explains that the hairs are so long they lay across his face. However, Shittoh Mekubbetzes has another reading in Rashi there: "and lies over his eyes."

72 Yeshayoh 40, 22.

73 That is, the first-born of one of his animals, which must either be redeemed, if it is an unclean animal, or sacrificed if not. If he does not wish to do that, he must wait until it becomes blemished, whereupon he may redeem it.

74 Bechoros 38a.

75 In Devorim 28, 27.

76 From the root y-l -p, which means "to cling."

77 Devorim 28, 27.

78 As in the verse just quoted from Devorim.

79 Since both are dry within.

80 Since {Hebrew Ref} is drier than {Hebrew Ref} . In either case, the inside must be dry because otherwise it would not be considered a permenant blemish, and so in essence there are only two possibilities, dry-inside, moist-outside, and altogether dry. However, since the Torah contains three terms for these skin diseases, one of them must change its meaning according to the context in which it finds itself (M.).

81 Bechoros 41a.

82 Iyyov 40, 17.

83 Aside from those listed in verse 20.

84 The entire phrase is redundant, and so Rashi explains it as a new rule unto itself; Sifra Emor, per. 3, 6.

85 See Rashi's next two comments.

86 Burnt-offerings, sin-offerings, etc.

87 Such as firstlings, etc.

88 If he may eat of the more sacred flesh, why would we think that he is forbidden the less sacred?

89 As described in 8, 29 above.

90 The "gifts" given to the kohein for offering the sacrifice, when the owners eat the rest of the flesh of the sacrifice.

91 To explain that a blemished kohein may eat of them, even though we find no precedent for it.

92 101b.

93 In other words, he is liable only for entering beyond the Curtain to perform a Temple-service, in the opinion of Rashi and the Ramban; the Rambam, however, holds that he is liable even for entering alone, with no Temple mission to perform (Sefer Hamitzvos 69, see B.B.).

94 That is, Sifra Emor, per. 3, 10. The reason for the mention of both is as follows: If only the Curtain had been mentioned, I would have thought that even though the Curtain and thus the inner altar were forbidden to him, the outer altar is still permitted, and so the mention of the altar tells us that this is not so. On the other hand, if the altar had been mentioned and not the Curtain, I would have thought that while service at the altar was forbidden to a blemished kohein, sprinkling the blood at the Curtain would be permitted, since the entire section refers to the flesh of sacrifices, and not the sprinkling of the blood---and so the Curtain too had to be mentioned.

95 Clearly the word {Hebrew Ref} , which may refer to the Temple or Tabernacle, does not do so here, because how could an invalid service profane the whole Temple? That is why Rashi interprets the word as referring to this blemished kohein's service (M.); Sifra Emor, per. 3, 11.

96 Rashi fills in the phrase, which the Torah left out as self-understood (M.).

97 See Sifra Emor, per. 3, 12.

Chapter 22 - Text Notes

98 Yechezkel 14, 7.

99 Yeshayoh 1, 4.

100 Sifra Emor, par. 1, 4.

101 That is, reverse the clauses of this verse so that it reads: "that they keep away from the holy offerings of Bnei Yisroel, which they sanctify for Me, and not profane My Holy Name," reversing the last two clauses. As a result, the phrase "which they sanctify for Me" refers not to its immediate neighbor, "My Holy Name," but the clause before it, "the holy offerings of Bnei Yisroel."

102 A separate point must be made of this because we might otherwise distinguish between the offerings of Israelites and those of kohanim in this regard, since there are a number of differences between the two classes: the kohanim are subject to more restrictions and are on a higher level of holiness (M.L.), while on the other hand, the Israelites' sacrifices are a daily occurence, while those of the kohanim are not (K.A.).

103 And not touch, as it might seem.

104 Vayikro 12, 4, which Sifra explains as referring to the prohibition of eating; see Rashi to 12, 4 and the note thereto.

105 This is a scribal error; the middoh used is a hekesh, another form of analogy, as explained in Yevomos 75a (M.), and as cited in the notes to Rashi's comment on 12, 4 above.

106 Death in his fifties without surviving offspring. Thus, koreis is the penalty for eating, but not mere touching, as Rashi proceeds to explain.

107 7, 20--21 above.

108 Plural of koreis. The two kerisos are mentioned in Tzav, in 7, 20 and 7, 21. As Rashi explains in his comments on 7, 21, based on the Gemoro in Shevu'os 7a, and in the continuation of his comment here, each comes to teach us a separate halachah.

109 Since eating perforce includes touching.

110 Sifra Emor, par. 4, 7.

111 Since that is what is intended, after all.

112 Its {Hebrew Ref} , the blood which makes the flesh permitted to be placed on the altar and then consumed or eaten. In the case of sin-offerings, for example, the blood must be sprinkled before the fat is burnt or the flesh eaten; Sifra Emor, par. 4, 7, Zevochim 45b.

113 7a.

114 I.e., a peace-offering. Another one of the rules of Torah interpretation handed down at Sinai is that of {Hebrew Ref} , "something that was included in the general rule, and [then] departed from that rule, did not depart to teach about itself [alone], but [rather] to teach about that general rule." In other words, an exception to a general rule will also affect our understanding of the rule. In this case, peace-offerings need not have been mentioned separately, since they are usually included in the general category of holy things; why then are they mentioned as a separate category here? According to the rule of {Hebrew Ref} , this teaches us that only sacrifices brought to the altar---similar to peace-offerings---are included in this rule which decrees koreis on one who eats sacrificial flesh while in a state of impurity. What then is excluded? Animals dedicated to the Temple upkeep. Thus, the two kerisos mentioned here (in verses 21 and 22) are needed for this middoh (M., see Shevu'os 7a and Rashi there).

115 One which is prescribed for people who cannot afford the more expensive sin-offerings; see Vayikro 5, 7--14.

116 That is, the third mention of koreis in connection with a peace-offering refers not to peace-offerings but rather to a sliding-scale sacrifice. The case concerns an unclean person who enters the Temple or eats clean sacrificial meat unknowingly; the point is that such a sliding-scale sacrifice (see 5, 2 above) applies to such a case only under the circumstances which apply to sin-offerings---when the prohibition is violated unknowingly, and when the prohibition, when violated intentionally, is one which results in the punishment of koreis.

117 Since it is sacrificial flesh of which we have been speaking, and also can mean either "on him" or "on it."

118 Rather than a ritually unclean kohein eating clean flesh.

119 That is, the phrase "and his impurity is on him" implies that it is on him---and not on the flesh, and though the word olov can also mean "on it," i.e., the flesh, that is not possible here because the kohein himself is the subject of this sentence.

120 While unclean flesh never again becomes ritually clean. See Sifra Emor, par. 4, 8.

121 Meaning therefore from the world as a whole (see Sifra Emor, par. 4, 10); he will die in his fifties without surviving offspring.

122 Chagigah 11a. That a minimum size is required we derive from the apparently unnecessary phrase "which causes impurity to him"---meaning, of a size sufficient to cause impurity (M.). The size itself is a tradition handed down to Moshe Rabbenu at Sinai.

123 Literally, "its."

124 Mishnah Oholos 2, 1.

125 A man who has a discharge; see 15, 2--15 above.

126 A woman who has a bloody discharge from her womb outside the time of her menstrual period; see 15, 25--30 above.

127 A menstruant woman; see 15, 19--24 above.

128 A woman who has just given birth; see 12, 2--8 above.

129 Literally, "him."

130 74b.

131 I.e., one-fortieth to one-sixtieth of the crop which is given to the kohein. "Holy things" in this verse does not refer to sacrifices; see note on Rashi's comment on the next verse, d.h. "Of holy things."

132 Literally, "to eat it."

133 That is, kohanim whose had become ritually impure, and had to immerse in a {Hebrew Ref} , may eat the terumoh after immersing and waiting for night time. Night time is marked by the appearance of three stars (M.).

134 Thus limiting the scope of this verse to terumoh (M.).

135 And does not refer to eating, which is dealt with in 11, 40 above.

136 The kohein.

137 That is, a bird which when properly slaughtered is permitted to be eaten. Here, however, it was not properly slaughtered, and became unclean for that reason. As Rashi explains, though, its mode of transmitting ritual impurity is different from other neveilos (carcasses).

138 That is, it does not transmit uncleanness by touch or by being carried.

139 That is, this bird carcass only transmits uncleanness through being swallowed---not by touch or carrying. This is derived from the way the verse seems to connect eating and tum'oh . If a bird carcass transmits uncleanness in the usual ways, why state that "he must not eat to defile himself with it"? Thus, "eating" rather than touch must have something to do with it (S.O.).

140 That is, an animal which suffered from an organic defect which would have killed it had it not been slaughtered.

141 Since it is an unclean bird (such as those listed in 11, 13--20 above) and is forbidden to be eaten in any case, the fact that it is a neveiloh is irrelevant. It is forbidden to be eaten even when it is not a neveiloh.

142 Sanhedrin 83a.

143 Which, unlike koreis, does not involve the death of his offspring and occurs somewhat later in life, at age 60. There are many reasons given why this expression, "and die because of it," refers to death at the hands of Heaven and not by an earthly court. Perhaps the most direct proof is that of the Ramban, that death by an earthly court is usually indicated by the expression "he shall surely die" ( {Hebrew Ref} ) or the like.

144 And context is decisive ( {Hebrew Ref} ).

145 A {Hebrew Ref} , such as {Hebrew Ref} , "the word of G-d," in place of {Hebrew Ref} ; the noun itself is {Hebrew Ref} , but when connected to the next noun, it has the form {Hebrew Ref} .

146 As explained in Shemos 21, 5--6, he decides that he wishes to remain with his master after the six-year period of servitude is over. The Jubilee year occurs every half-century; see 25, 8--25 below.

147 That is, after serving for six years, unless he can buy his freedom earlier; see Shemos 21, 1--4.

148 I.e., that he may eat.

149 That is, if his master is a kohein, he may not eat terumoh because he and the {Hebrew Ref} are not absolute possessions of the master, as though they were members of his family, in contrast to a Canaanite slave, as Rashi explains immediately below; Sifra Emor, per. 4, 17, Yevomos 70b.

150 Since he belongs to his master in this sense he may eat of his master's terumoh.

151 As set forth in Shemos 21, 4. If his master gives a Hebrew slave a Canaanite maidservant to live with, the children remain with the master when the Hebrew gains his freedom.

152 That is, one of the ways in which a marriage is made is by the woman accepting a sum of money (these days, in the form of a ring) from the groom, as set out in Mishnah Kiddushin 1, 1.

153 Bemidbar 18, 11. Rashi cites this second verse because marriage may be contracted in other ways, for example by a marriage contract, and our verse does not cover those cases (Levush).

154 The Midrash Halochoh on Bemidbor-Devorim, on the verse indicated---Korach, pisko 117.

155 Literally, "a stranger."

156 Sifra Emor, par. 5, 7.

157 But if she has children by a kohein she may eat terumoh (M.).

158 Yevomos 87a.

159 One whose near relative has just died, and must attend to his or her burial.

160 Yevomos 68b.

161 Literally, "in the state of being a stranger," i.e., a non-kohein , a stranger to the kehunoh.

162 Literally, "the state of being an {Hebrew Ref} ." A kohein who is an {Hebrew Ref} may eat of terumoh despite his onenus, but one who is not a kohein is prohibited from eating terumoh.

163 Once again, context determines the subject, which involves an Israelite or Levite eating terumoh, which is forbidden to them.

164 If the verse had stated: "And give to the kohein a holy thing," and not "the holy thing," I might have thought that the non-kohein need merely buy terumoh from a kohein and compensate the other kohein for his loss. Since the verse states "the holy thing," it indicates that he must actually give back the terumoh he took---but that has (presumably) already been eaten! Moreover, this cannot refer to the fifth and the value of the separated terumoh, because that has already been mentioned. What is left is what Rashi indicates---common, unseparated crops from which he must compensate the kohein (M.).

165 Pesochim 32b. The essential point is that he is not permitted to use terumoh which he has already separated from his crops, but he must take the compensatory terumoh from his own store of produce (L.B.).

166 This is a prohibition for a kohein to feed a non-kohein terumoh (B.Y.).

167 That is, the non-kohein who separated the terumoh, as Rashi proceeds to explain.

168 The non- kohanim.

169 That is, the owner who separated terumoh from his crops for the kohein, may not eat of it even though he has not yet given it to the kohanim, and if he does so with full knowledge and intent, he is guilty (G.A., B.B.).

170 Meaning that the kohanim ate the terumoh while they were ritually impure, something forbidden in 22, 1 above.

171 Since Targum implies that the sin comes about because the kohanim themselves eat of the kohanim while ritually unclean---but that prohibition was already mentioned in verse 9 as Rashi stated there.

172 In other words: "or burden themselves."

173 Bemidbor 6, 13.

174 Devorim 34, 6.

175 To Bemidbor, Noso pisko 32.

176 Literally, "Behold [an obligation] on myself." And so if it is lost he is obligated to replace it.

177 And so he is only obligated to offer the animal he designated, and need not replace it if the original is lost.

178 That is, we must not understand the phrase literally, "according to your desire"---that one who brings the offering may do with it as he wishes, but just the reverse, that he must follow G-d's instructions in the matter (G.A., B.M.H.).

179 Since these requirements are not mentioned here, they presumably do not apply to bird-offerings (D.H., see Rashi on Kiddushin 24b).

180 Sifra Emor, par. 7, 2. However, the invalidation of the loss of a limb is actually derived from 1, 14 above, as Rashi points out there.

181 As when he says: "I am obligated [to bring this sacrifice]" or "Behold, this [I will bring," as explained above, but it is not sufficient to merely consider or think about it (L.B.).

182 {Hebrew Ref} is the feminine form of ivvoron.

183 Thus connecting this word with the preceding verse: "No blemish shall be in it, [as] blindness." Then begins the next sentence, as Rashi notes: "Or broken-limbed it shall not be."

184 {Hebrew Ref} is an adjective, as opposed to {Hebrew Ref} , which is a noun.

185 Bechoros 38a.

186 A wart.

187 Shofetim 16, 29.

188 See verse 21, 20 above.

189 Here, and in verses 20 and 24.

190 Temuroh 6b-7a.

191 In paired limbs of the body; see verse 21, 18 above.

192 Which is ordinarily a sign of uncleanness, see 11, 4--6 above; here however we have an animal which is otherwise ritually pure---an ox, for example---but which has this one sign of uncleanness; Bechoros 40a.

193 The animal is sold and the proceeds go for the upkeep of the Temple.

194 And if you ask why {Hebrew Ref} ("Temple repair") animals are called "free-will-offerings" ( {Hebrew Ref} ), while animals destined for the altar are called "vows" ( {Hebrew Ref} ) when the only difference between vows and free-will-offerings is the matter of responsibility for lost animals, the reason is, as the Ramban explains, that the Torah most often uses the term {Hebrew Ref} for {Hebrew Ref} purposes, and not for bringing animals to the altar, unless specified (K.M.).

195 Bechoros 39b.

196 Amos 6, 11.

197 Shabbos 80b.

198 Otherwise, we might think that only ritually clean animals may not be castrated, since only they are brought to the altar. Since they are the subject of this section, it could be argued that the prohibitions listed here apply only to them (L.B.).

199 As opposed to an obligation which pertains to the land, that is, the land of Israel, such as maaser, terumoh and the like, this mitzvoh pertains to the person---it is an obligation on a person no matter where he or she lives---such as Shabbos, not wearing shaatnez, etc.

200 I.e., non-Jews. The rules governing acceptable animal sacrifices are less strict for them than for Jews.

201 I.e., their own altars which do not have kohanim serving them; Temuroh 7a.

202 That is, blemished animals.

203 As free-will-offerings, as Rashi explains (G.A.).

204 Chullin 13b.

205 Which is not born in the normal way, but cut out of its mother's womb; Chullin 38b.

206 Literally, "son."

207 In Chullin 78b it is derived from a comparison (binyan ov ) with {Hebrew Ref} in Devorim 22, 6 (sending away the mother bird before taking the eggs from the nest), which applies only to the mother bird, and not the father. Rashi follows the view of the Sages, and not that of Chananiyoh, who holds that the prohibition applies to both male and females.

208 Chullin 78a. The reason is that the young follow after the mother and not the father, the dam and not the sire. The reason for the expression "him and his son" is only grammatical; because the Hebrew words {Hebrew Ref} , "lamb," and {Hebrew Ref} , "ox," are masculine, the Torah uses a masculine pronoun, even though the mother is intended.

209 That is, even if the calf or lamb is slaughtered before the dam, it is still forbidden, even though the dam is mentioned first. The reason for this is the plural of "you shall not slaughter," which implies that there are two slaughterers who can be held liable, one who slaughters the dam first and one who slaughters the offspring first; for further details, see Chullin 82a.

210 That G-d should be pleased with your offering.

211 See Rashi on 19, 5.

212 {Hebrew Ref} can also mean "according to your will," and Rashi explains that the slaughter (for sacrifice) must be intentional. If someone lifts up the slaughtering knive without thought, and in the process inadvertantly slaughters the animal, it is invalid, even if the slaughtering itself was done validly. This refers only to slaughtering for the altar, but not for common use (L.B.).

213 Chullin 13a.

214 That is, peace-offerings, the rules for which were given in 19, 7 above. As for the proper time for eating the flesh of peace-offerings, that is laid down in 7, 18 above.

215 As for example a thanksgiving-offering.

216 Literally, "in order that."

217 Even though this was already stated in the previous verse, here Rashi gives the reason for this interpretation (B.B.).

218 7, 15 above.

219 Even though it "only" involves a matter of thought, and not action.

220 Study them well so as not to forget them, and so preserve them (L.B.).

221 Since a verb such as "do" certainly refers to action, i.e, fulfilling the {Hebrew Ref} ; Sifra Emor, per. 9, 3 (M.).

222 For this is the essence of the Profanation of G-d's Name ( {Hebrew Ref} ) (L.B.).

223 What else remains but to avoid Chillul Hashem? (L.B.).

224 A positive act of sanctification, as when idolators threaten him or her with death unless he or she worships their idol. A Jew must be prepared to sacrifice his life to maintain faithfulness to G-d.

225 I.e., a minimum of ten adult males, a minyan; this is derived from the gezeroh shovoh of the word {Hebrew Ref} , "the midst" and that in Bemidbor 16, 21, in regard to the ten spies, of whom the word is also used. Just as they were a band of ten adult males, so too is a minyan needed to witness a martyrdom (Bartinoro).

226 That is, in the expectation of a miracle happening to save him or her from death.

227 And certainly if he prepares to sacrifice himself only because he expects a miracle, this is hardly a {Hebrew Ref} , a sanctification of the Name! (N.Y.).

228 Doniel's companions, who refused to worship the idol Nebuchadnezzar set up, and were thrown into a fiery furnace.

229 Doniel 3, 18. This is what they said to Nebuchadnezzar, not knowing that a miracle would be performed for them.

230 Sifra Emor, per. 9, 5.

231 That you be prepared to sacrifice yourselves for Him.

232 Sifra Emor, per. 9, 6.

Chapter 23 - Text Notes

233 The three pilgrimage festivals, {Hebrew Ref} , Pesach, Shevu'os and Sukkos, when adult males were required to bring sacrifices to Jerusalem. However, strictly speaking, the word includes all the festivals listed below, and that is how G.A. takes it; see n. XX below.

234 In their observance. By making it possible for people from far off to come to Jerusalem for Pesach, the Sanhedrin allowed them to become practiced and familiar with the Service in the Temple. However, G.A. reads the word {Hebrew Ref} , "practiced, familiar," as {Hebrew Ref} , "teaching, learning," since that is the essential purpose of these pilgrimage festivals.

235 A second Adar to allow time for the people from abroad to reach Jerusalem.

236 The Diaspora, outside the land of Israel.

237 Literally, "have become uprooted from their place."

238 Why is Shabbos mentioned in this listing of festivals? There is a basic difference between the two, since the time of Shabbos has been fixed by G-d from Creation onward, and the dates of the festivals are set by the Sanhedrin, and depends on when they proclaim the beginning of the lunar month in which the festival falls. Why list these two types of observance together? (M.L.)

239 Even though they have "only" been fixed by a human court and not by the heavenly one.

240 For the festivals too are called "sabbaths," and there are seven of them, just as the week, which culminates on Shabbos, contains seven days: two days of Pesach (in the land of Israel), one of Shevu'os, one of Rosh Hashanah (by Torah law), Yom Kippur, the first day of Sukkos, and the first day of Shemini Atzeres (G.A.).

241 Sifra Emor, par. 9, 7.

242 Since the lunar year consists of twelve lunar months of approximately 29 1/4 days, a lunar year of 354 is 11 days shorter than the solar year. If nothing is done to coordinate them, all the festivals would "wander" through the year. This cannot be allowed to happen, since Pesach must fall during the spring and Sukkos must fall during the harvest season in autumn. Therefore the Torah instructs the beis din to add a month every few years in order to keep the two years in balance. At one time this was arranged year by year, but since the abolition of the nesi'us in Eretz Yisroel, we have had a calendar which regulates these extra months on a 19-year cycle, with seven of them in every cycle---during the third, sixth, eighth, eleventh, fourteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth. See verse 39 below.

243 Officially proclaiming the appearance of the new moon and the beginning of the new lunar month; this was originally done by the Sanhedrin. The repetition of the phrase "these are the appointed times of Ad-noy" hints at a second type of proclamation or sanctification (M., G.A.).

244 The "hours" meant here are solar hours. The day is divided into twelve hours, no matter what the season. Thus, these hours vary from day to day, as the duration of daylight changes. "Noon" in this system is always the time when the sun is at its highest point in the sky and starts descending. Rashi's source is Sifra Emor, per. 11, 1.

245 Rashi notes this because the word pesach can refer both to the festival and to the sacrificial lamb brought as a korban pesach in the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nisan, and eaten after the Seder meal (M.).

246 In Bemidbor 28, 19.

247 Since, generally speaking, the Torah leaves the enumeration of these sacrifices for Parshas Pinchos, and does not mention them here in connection with other festivals, such as Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, why are they mentioned in this connection?

248 Sifra Emor, per. 11, 5.

249 Not the form {Hebrew Ref} , which refers to the number "seven" when standing alone, but {Hebrew Ref} , "seven of," in this case, "a seven of days."

250 That is, they constitute a unit, and not merely seven individual days (G.A.).

251 Literally, "labor and necessity."

252 Work which cannot be made up later; the prohibition of work on the first and last days cannot be suspended for such work either, though such work may be done on the intermediate days ( {Hebrew Ref} ).

253 Literally, "the common [time] of the festival."

254 The Mishnah continues: "The verse says: "It is [a day of holy assembly"---it [=that day of the festival, i.e., the first and last day] is [a day on which] work of labor is forbidden, [but] the [intermediate days] of the festival are not [days on which] work of labor is forbidden (Sifra Emor, par. 12, 8).

255 Sifra Emor, par. 10, 3. That is, that it should be the very first grain harvested, and no one was allowed to harvest his own crop before this was done (M.). G.A. however emphasizes that this means that no crop could be harvested before the Omer was offered.

256 Shemos 16, 18. An ephoh is about 33 dry quarts.

257 Actually, he waves it in all four directions, as R. Yochanan in Menochos 62a explains. The horizontal motion is "for Him to Whom all four directions belong," and the vertical motion is "for Him to Whom heaven and earth belong."

258 Even though here the vertical motion is not mentioned in our verse, we learn that every "waving" consists of the horizontal and vertical motions, since both are mentioned in Shemos 29, 27, even though only "waving" is mentioned in 29, 26. From this we see that the "waving" of verse 26 there includes the vertical motion mentioned in verse 27 (G.A.).

259 Menochos 62a.

260 Sifra Emor, par. 10, 4.

261 I.e., the Sabbath day, as the heretical Tzedukim said.

262 Since there is no further specification, and since the Torah intended to provide the necessary information, the use of the word "Shabbos" must refer to the first day of Pesach rather than any Sabbath; Sifra Emor, per. 12, 1, Menochos 66a.

263 And so it is not listed among the additional sacrifices ( {Hebrew Ref} ) in Parshas Pinchos (Bemidbor 28) (G.A.).

264 That is, it is double the amount required for a lamb. The usual wine-offering, as set forth in Bemidbar 28 for various meal-offerings---a tenth of an ephoh. Here double the tenth---two tenths---is required.

265 About six-and-a-half quarts.

266 That is, the tender ears become parched after they have been dried in an oven. See Rashi on Vayikro 2, 14 above.

267 "Ears of corn."

268 That is, eating from new grain before the omer is offered.

269 Kiddushin 37a. According to the second view, the prohibition of chodosh does not apply outside the land of Israel.

270 See verse 11 above.

271 Literally, "from the evening."

272 If one begins to count in the morning.

273 Since the twenty-four hours of the day begin with nightfall, one night will be missing from this seven-week period; Sifra Emor, par. 12, 6, Menochos 66a.

274 Rashi wishes to ensure that we do not mistakenly take the word "Shabbos" in its usual meaning; here it means "a week" and not the meaning it had above, "festival day" (M., G.A.).

275 "Until" can include the day mentioned, or exclude it; because of the requirement that we count seven complete weeks, it is clear that we exclude the last day, which is Shevu'os (G.A.).

276 Interpreting the verse: "on the fiftieth day, bring the meal-offering," and not, as we might have thought, that we count fifty days and only then bring the meal offering.

277 But not, as noted above, the fiftieth day.

278 On the fifty-first day.

279 That is, the word {Hebrew Ref} , "you should count, "does not precede the word {Hebrew Ref} , "fifty," but follows it: "Until the fiftieth day you should count"---but not on the fiftieth day. {Hebrew Ref} can mean either "fifty" or "fiftieth." Here Rashi notes that it means "the fiftieth" and not "fifty," since we are not supposed to count to fifty days (M.), but only forty-nine. If {Hebrew Ref} would have the meaning "fifty," it would contradict the previous verse, which instructs us to count only seven weeks, or forty-nine days (G.A.).

280 And that is why it is called "a new meal offering"---that it is the first of all meal-offerings, as the phrase {Hebrew Ref} implies. If the Torah had used the phrase {Hebrew Ref} , "a meal-offering of the new [crop]," the implication would have been that the meal-offering must come from new grain, since the word chodosh in 26, 10 has this meaning. The phrase {Hebrew Ref} implies both that the wheat be from the new wheat crop and that this meal-offering must inaugurate a new series of meal offerings (Malbim). This new wheat meal-offering must therefore be distinguished from the omer barley-offering. Barley for the omer was the very first crop harvested, and the first harvesting of the wheat was for the bikkurim, as it is called in verse 17, and the "new meal-offering," as it is called here (G.A.).

281 Menochos 84b. This "new meal-offering" must come from wheat, as the word {Hebrew Ref} , "fine flour," implies. However, the omer comes from barley, as the Sages learn from a gezeroh shovoh from the use of the word {Hebrew Ref} in Vayikro 2, 14 and Shemos 9, 31, where {Hebrew Ref} applies to barley. Thus, this new wheat meal offering is not in the same series as the Omer (L.B.).

282 Sifra Emor, per. 13, 1. The word "dwellings" implies your permanent residence, which must be the land of Israel, and not any place of exile.

283 In the last verse. Both the "new meal-offering" and "the bread of raising" (which is called "firstfruits" at the end of our verse) are "firsts," and therefore refer to the very same offering (G.A.).

284 Of the suspected adulteress of Bemidbor 5, 15.

285 Mentioned in this verse; Sifra Emor, per. 12, 9. G.A. explains that the phrase "first fruits" (bikkurim) refers to the "new" meal-offerings mentioned above, and not the grain which was harvested. The meal-offering must be the first of all meal offerings offered that year, though not the first grain harvested, which was the omer, as explained above. Thus, the two breads mentioned here permitted new grain to be used for the meal offerings in the Temple---even barley -offerings such as that of the suspected adulteress ( {Hebrew Ref} ), while the omer permitted new grain to be used by people outside the Temple (G.A., see B.Y. and D.H.).

286 That is, {Hebrew Ref} is not to be understood in its literal sense as "on" the bread, but "for the sake of the bread." "For the sake of the bread" however does not imply that these lambs are brought in order that the "bread" in Jewish houses be blessed, but rather the phrase "for the sake of" must imply an obligation, as Rashi proceeds to explain (M.). The sacrifices must be brought "for the sake of the bread"---and only for its sake; without the bread the sacrifices could not be brought.

287 Sifra Emor, per. 13, 4, Menochos 45b.

288 Bemidbor 28, 12--14. And that is why the exact details did not have to be specified here, since they are available there (G.A.).

289 As set forth in Bemidbor 15, 1--16.

290 About six-and-a-half quarts.

291 Bemidbor 28, 27--30.

292 In Bemidbor 28, 27.

293 Since here we have one ox and two rams, while there two oxen and one ram are stated.

294 Literally, "say from now."

295 And both groups are brought on Shevu'os; Sifra Emor, per. 13, 6.

296 Thus, the two lambs require waving, but not the other animals mentioned; see Menochos 62a, where the discussion of "waving" concerns only the two lambs.

297 {Hebrew Ref} (sacrifices of a greater degree of sanctity) can be eaten only by kohanim, and only within the Temple, while {Hebrew Ref} , sacrifices of a lesser degree of sanctity, can be eaten by non-kohanim, and in the city of Jerusalem. Since our verse states that this peace-offering is "holy...to the kohein ," it must classify it as belonging to the first category, since if were of the second category, that would not have to be stated---could anyone think that peace-offerings would have no sanctity whatever? (M.).

298 Which was already mentioned above, in 19, 9.

299 Sifra Emor, per. 13, 12.

300 Mishnah Pe'oh 5, 6.

301 Thus indicating how important giving to the poor is in G-d's sight (K.M.).

302 Ten verses which mention G-d's remembering human beings for good.

303 Verses recited on Rosh Hashanah which mention the shofor, which is blown that day. Sifra Emor, par. 11, 1; Rosh Hashanah 32a. The Ramban objects that if so, Rashi should have mentioned the verses recited on Rosh Hashanah which mention the Kingdom of G-d ( {Hebrew Ref} ), since there cannot be any mention of Remembrances without these as well. M. points out that Rashi does not intend to go through the whole Rosh Hashanah service here, but merely to explain the expression {Hebrew Ref} ---which he has done.

304 And so we sound the ram's horn in remembrance of Avrohom Ovinu's willingness to sacrifice his only son to G-d. We hope that merit will bring us forgiveness.

305 In Bemidbor 29, 2.

306 Sifra Emor, per. 14, 2.

307 Dying in one's fifties without surviving offspring.

308 For each "count" of the prohibition.

309 Since work on Yom Kippur is prohibited "on this very day" in verse 30, I might think that work is prohibited only during the day, and so verse 31 corrects that misimpression (G.A.).

310 Literally, "clean."

311 Many editions print this comment in connection with verse 27, in regard to Yom Kippur. That is why clothing and prayer are mentioned here, in contrast to the food and drink mentioned in connection with other festivals.

312 Literally, "clean."

313 See Sifra Emor, par. 12, 4, though prayer is not mentioned there.

314 The Midrash that Rashi cites here accounts for the very special character of Shemini Atzeres, which is different from the other festivals in several respects. First, the word {Hebrew Ref} indicates "holding back," and no other festival is described by that word. Moreover, the eighth day is different in character from the seven days of Sukkos, since each of the mitzvos of Sukkos---the four minim and the sukkoh ---must be kept for seven days (according to Torah law), and so neither applies to Shemini Atzeres.

315 Even work that, if it is not done on time, will cause a loss ( {Hebrew Ref} ).

316 And "it" is a limitation---labor of all sorts is forbidden on the holiday, but not its intermediate days, when {Hebrew Ref} ---work which if not done will be lost, is permitted; Sifra Emor, par. 12, 8.

317 Even though the verse says "a burnt-offering and a meal-offering" rather than "a burnt-offering and its meal-offering," the intent is the same, since no other meal-offering is mentioned in connection with Shemini Atzeres (G.A.). This meal-offering accompanies the burnt-offering which is part of the musofim, the additional sacrifices, and both of them are burnt on the altar, in the order specified: burnt-offering, meal-offering, followed by the wine-offerings, which are not burnt (B.B.). However, if the meal and wine-offerings are delayed to another day, there is a dispute among the Sages as to what order prevails (N.Y., see Menochos 44b).

318 Bemidbor 29, 13--36.

319 Sifra Emor, per. 14, 9.

320 Each pilgrim who ascends to Jerusalem must not come empty-handed, but he must bring two sacrifices, a burnt-offering ( {Hebrew Ref} ) for the altar, and a peace-offering or offerings ( {Hebrew Ref} ) to help celebrate the festival with family and friends. The number of peace-offerings offered depends on the size of the number of people celebrating together.

321 That is, the word {Hebrew Ref} refers to a sacrifice, as in Shemos 5, 1, "and let them bring Me a sacrifice in the wilderness" (G.A., L.B.).

322 I.e., it does not supersede the Shabbos.

323 That is, the seven days of the festival may be used for bringing the festival-offerings one failed to bring on the first day (not including the paschal lamb, which must be brought on the fourteenth, even if it falls on a Shabbos).

324 That is, if he fails to bring it on the first day, he may bring it during the rest of the festival, and so there is no need to bring it on Shabbos.

325 I.e., to add a leap month to certain years; see next note.

326 Since the lunar year consists of twelve lunar months of approximately 29 1/4 days, a lunar year of 354 days is 11 days shorter than the solar year. If nothing is done to coordinate them, all the festivals would "wander" through the year. This cannot be allowed to happen, since Pesach must fall during the spring and Sukkos, as our verse implies, must fall during the harvest season in autumn. Therefore the Torah instructs the beis din to add a month every few years in order to keep the solar and lunar years in balance. At one time this was arranged year by year, but since the abolition of the nesi'us in Eretz Yisroel, we have had a calendar which regulates these extra months on a 19-year cycle, with seven of them in every cycle---during the third, sixth, eighth, eleventh, fourteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth.

327 See note 320 above.

328 Literally, "on this."

329 Literally, "on this."

330 That is, perhaps the pilgrim is required to bring sacrifices each day.

331 Since verse 41 states "it," which is a limitation.

332 Chagigoh 9a; see Rashi's comments note 324 above.

333 Sukkoh 35a. According to R. Samson Raphael Hirsch in his commentary on Chumosh, the essences which give the fruit its special aroma are also in its leaves and wood, and so they all have a similar taste.

334 Interpreting {Hebrew Ref} , "beautiful," as {Hebrew Ref} , "that which dwells," as R. Avohu does in Sukkoh 35a; see Rashi there.

335 Ibid. Since its fruit requires two or even three years to ripen, it remains on the tree from year to year (Ramban).

336 To indicate the plural.

337 And that is the lulov. Why then does the Torah use the plural kapos, if only one is intended? This is because the palm tree has one main trunk from which many smaller "palms" issue, and if the singular kaf had been used, we might have thought that the entire large trunk was intended. Therefore the Torah used a form which combines the singular and the plural, to tell us that one small palm is required (B.B.).

338 From which comes the word {Hebrew Ref} .

339 Three leaves issuing from one point of the branch and covering it; Sukkoh 32b.

340 Sifra Emor, per. 17, 9. It might be thought that the word "native-born" would exclude converts, who are not native-born Jews, but the addition of the word "Israelites," indicates that there is an inclusion here and not an exclusion, especially in light of the word kol, "all," which is always inclusive (L.B., see B.M.H.).

341 Sifra Emor, per. 17, 11, Mechilta 12. Since the verse emphasizes that G-d caused them to dwell in sukkos, these could not be man-made huts which the Israelites built for themselves (M.).

Chapter 24 - Text Notes

342 Shemos 27, 20--21.

343 For the proper understanding of the menorah, the lamp in the Tabernacle, some idea of the production of the oil had to be given.

344 The words beginning the section in Shemos: {Hebrew Ref} , "you shall command," i.e., you will in the future command Bnei Yisroel to press olive oil.

345 86a.

346 Sifra Emor, par. 13, 1. Here is the description taken from Menochos. There are three [ways of making ready the] olives and each one gives three kinds of oil. The first crop of olives is when the olives are picked from the top of the tree; they are pounded [in a mortar] and put into the basket and the oil oozes out and filters through the basket into the vessel below. This produces the first oil. They [=the pounded olives] are then pressed with the beam [of the oil press]; this produces the second oil. They [=the olives after being pressed] are then ground and pressed again; this produces the third oil. The second and third [oils] are invalid for [use] in the menorah but are valid for meal-offerings.

347 Thus, {Hebrew Ref} , which can mean "constantly, continuously," here means "on a daily (or nightly) basis." No day should pass without a burnt-offering, and no night without the lighting of the lamps (see Rashi on Shemos 27, 20).

348 Since it contains the stone Tablets of Testimony (luchos ho-edus).

349 Literally, "its fellows."

350 Shabbos 22b, Menochos 86b. That is, it would burn longer than all the others, for even though he lit it first, it lasted the longest---until he had finished lighting all the others the next day.

351 Literally, "measure," so that it would be adequate for the whole night.

352 Some six-and-a-half to fourteen ounces.

353 I.e., winter, when the nights are long.

354 Menochos 89a. If this quantity of oil was sufficient for the long nights of winter, it was certainly sufficient for the rest of the year.

355 I.e., without any intervening material (D.H.).

356 Before arranging the lights. See Sifra Emor, par. 13, 12.

357 Rashi wishes to prevent any misunderstanding, and so makes it absolutely clear that the twelve loaves should be divided evenly between two stacks; we should not think that the words {Hebrew Ref} be taken as meaning that there should be "two stacks [and] six stacks" or "two loaves on each of six stacks" (M., G.A., N.Y.). The twelve loaves of showbread were placed on the Table every week, but arranged with supports so that they did not lie on top of each other and become stale. The kohanim who were on duty for the week would eat it afterwards.

358 That is, the very top of the table, as Rashi proceeds to explain.

359 The vertical tubes which supported the horizontal tubes upon which the loaves actually rested.

360 Sifra Emor, per. 18, 4, Menochos 97a, and see Rashi on Shemos 25, 29 for the shape of the showbread and the construction of the supports.

361 Or: next to; see next note.

362 That is, there were two bowls in all, one on each stack, not that there were two bowls on each one of the two stacks. From Rashi's description it might be thought that the bowls should be put "on each one of the two stacks," thus breaking the top breads, and perhaps more; however, since the Torah went to great lengths to prevent the loaves from getting stale, it is unlikely that it would allow them to be broken (see M.L.). However, this is by no means clear. In the Mishnah (Menochos 96a) there is a dispute between the Sages and Abba Sho'ul on this matter. Abba Sho'ul interprets the word {Hebrew Ref} , "on" in its alternate sense of "nearby, next to," as in Bemidbor 2, 20, as does Rabbi in Menochos 98a, and the Sifra in per. 18, 6; the Sages of the Mishnah interpret {Hebrew Ref} in its more usual sense, and insist that the bowls were placed on the tops of the two stacks of bread. M. assumes that Rashi follows the opinion of the Sages in the Mishnah, but M.L. points out that Rashi is merely citing the Mishnah, and it is not clear that which opinion he was following --- {Hebrew Ref} in Rashi too can mean "next to"! On the other hand, G.A. argues that Rashi was indeed following the opinion of the Sages in the Mishnah, since the more usual meaning of {Hebrew Ref} is "on" and that is the plain meaning of the verse.

363 As in the case of the meal-offering of Vayikro 2, 2, from which Sifra learns this by a gezeroh shovoh, the use of two identical or similar expressions (M., see Sifra Emor, per. 18, 7).

364 Rashi wishes to point out that the use of a feminine verbal form, literally, "and she shall be," excludes several possibilities. It cannot refer to loaves of verse 5, for that would require a plural, {Hebrew Ref} , nor can it refer to the word {Hebrew Ref} , "bread," as a general designation for the loaves, as in verse 7, for that would require a masculine singular, {Hebrew Ref} . It must therefore refer only to the frankincense, which is a feminine singular noun (B.Y.). Moreover, the use of this verb indicates that the frankincense, though divided into two bowls, is considered as one "memorial portion," and so both must be burnt, and if one is lost, the other cannot be offered. This halachah is recorded in Menochos 27a, and here Rashi implies the source for it (Shem Olom, D.H.).

365 See Sifra Emor, per. 18, 7.

366 The feminine singular verb, {Hebrew Ref} , cannot refer to anything but the frankincense or memorial portion, both of which are feminine nouns. But here neither is possible, since neither can be eaten by the kohanim, as the verse specifies. Therefore, the only possibility is that the verb refers to the "meal-offering," {Hebrew Ref} , a feminine noun, even though we never find the showbread called a meal-offering (see B.Y. and N.Y.).

367 The word {Hebrew Ref} , "bread," is masculine and thus agrees with the suffix -hu ( {Hebrew Ref} , "and they shall eat it"); otherwise it would be -oh ( {Hebrew Ref} ). Thus, when the verse refers to the same object---the bread, in the feminine, as in the feminine verb, {Hebrew Ref} , "it shall belong," at the beginning of this verse, the verb refers to another aspect of the bread, it status as a {Hebrew Ref} , a meal-offering, which is a feminine noun (B.Y.).

368 Or: his eternity, i.e., his portion in the next world, since the verse before mentions the phrase "an eternal portion" (M.K.), and certainly by becoming guilty of a capital crime he lost this world (N.Y.).

369 Literally, "warm."

370 Since it was baked before Shabbos on Friday and not eaten until before the next Shabbos, the ninth day.

371 Actually, this is nothing more than our equivalent of a question-mark, indicating that the previous sentence should be read as a question and not a statement.

372 His mother's tribe.

373 Literally, "they said to him."

374 Literally, "What is your nature [=origin] [to be] here?"

375 In the Torah, in Bemidbor 2, 2. The point is that tribal descent is only reckoned from the father, and not the mother; since his father was an Egyptian, he actually had no tribe, though he was Jewish because of his mother.

376 I.e., they ruled against him; he had no case.

377 Sifra Emor, par. 14, 1, Vayikro Rabbo 32. According to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 7, 5): "The blasphemer is not liable until he pronounces the Name clearly. Everyone [but the judges, witnesses and condemned] are told to leave the court room and the judges speak to the oldest of them [=the witnesses], and say to him: 'Say explicitly what you heard [and not just by title].' And he says [what he heard]; the judges rise and rend [their garments at the blasphemous words, to express their dismay that G-d's Name has been treated so disrespectfully in their presence], and they do not repair [the tear in their garments]. The second [witness] says: 'And I too [heard the same],' and [so too] the third [witness, if there is one] says: 'And I too [heard the same].'

378 Ibid. He is called "an Egyptian man," rather than merely "an Egyptian," to indicate that he was the same "Egyptian man" of Shemos 2, 11 who was beating the Hebrew slave, and whom Moshe killed (G.A.).

379 Since the verse emphasizes that he was "in the midst" of the Israelites. However, this is difficult, since as the son of a Jewish mother he should not have had to convert. The Ramban notes that the French scholars suggest that the halochoh that the child of a Jewish mother is Jewish even if the father is not was not in effect before Mattan Torah. Since this person was born before Mattan Torah, he was not considered Jewish and had to convert. The Ramban himself suggests that this Egyptian converted along with the rest of the Jewish people at Sinai, with the sprinkling of the blood and immersion; but what need was there for Rashi to mention this? P.Y., quoting She'elos Uteshuvos Beis Yitzchok, suggests that Rashi does indeed hold the opinion that a child born of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father is not automatically Jewish and needs conversion (Kiddushin 46b).

380 As Rashi explained above, the argued over where this half-Egyptian could pitch his tent among the Danites.

381 That is, the Name that is properly applied only to G-d. The noun {Hebrew Ref} can be either holy or profane, depending on whether it is applied to G-d or to idols; the {Hebrew Ref} , the four-letter Name (Tetragrammaton), can only refer to Him.

382 That is, the Proper Name; both terms refer to the same Name of G-d.

383 Sifra Emor, par. 14, 2. Malbim suggests that since Rashi (see on verse 12 below) explains that he and the man who profaned the Shabbos by gathering wood (see Bemidbor 15, 32--36) were caught at approximately the same time, this incident would have occurred before Mattan Torah, during the first year after the Exodus; how then could he have heard the Proper Name at Sinai? Malbim therefore suggests that the proper reading in Rashi (and the Sifra) is not {Hebrew Ref} , "that he heard," but {Hebrew Ref} , "that they heard," referring to the Israelites. This assumes a scribal error both in Rashi and the Sifra, with no evidence in early editions or manuscripts. However, E.H. points out that the dating of this incident to the first year itself is not without its difficulties, since the showbread was part of the service in the Tabernacle, and that did not begin until the second year, after the Tabernacle was erected. Likewise, the encampment was not organized until then either. He therefore suggests (following M. and Hiz.) that the encampment was informally organized according to tribes during the first year, and a commandment regarding the showbread was given then as well, even though the Tabernacle was not yet built. However, this does not solve the problem raised by the Malbim. Altogether, the solution proposed by D.D. seems to solve all these. D.D. suggests that these two aggodos cited are conflicting; that the opinions that this half-Egyptian mocked the showbread or that he was prevented from pitching his tent with the Danites do not also hold that this incident occured at the same time as that of the wood-gatherer. That incident occurred during the first year, while the Egyptian blasphemed during the second. On the other hand, the one who holds that they did take place at the same time, during the first year, holds the first reason Rashi cites above for the Egyptian's blasphemy, namely, that he lost his share in this world and perhaps the next by blaspheming, a sin even for Noachides, and so applicable even before Mattan Torah, but not because of any dispute over his place in the camp. There is therefore no contradiction between a date in the first year and the reason for his blasphemy.

384 She allowed an Egyptian man to have relations with her. However, Rashi himself in his comments to Shemos 2, 11 observes that she thought the Egyptian was her husband; why does he then call her a "wayward woman" here? Indeed, the Egyptian was the slavedriver that Moshe killed, and the Hebrew slave he was beating was the husband of Shelomis: During the night he woke him (her husband) and forced him to leave the house. [The Egyptian then] returned and entered the house and came upon the wife, while she thought that he was her husband. The [Israelite] man returned home and sensed what had occurred. When that Egyptian realized that he sensed what had happened, he beat and terrorized him the entire day." Why then is she called a "wayward woman"? Because what attracted the Egyptian to her was her chatter (N.Y., D.H.). Legally, too, even rape by a non-Jew disqualifies a woman from marrying a kohein, and the child is genealogically defective (M., D.D., G.A.).

385 Literally, "Peace be on you." The third is in the plural. The word "peace" ( {Hebrew Ref} ) was always on her lips, and that is why the Torah calls her "Shelomis."

386 And thus the Torah calls her {Hebrew Ref} , connecting Divri with {Hebrew Ref} , "to speak."

387 In this case, of course, the blasphemer could not cause disgrace to his father, who was either unknown or not with the Israelites. Rashi here states a general rule, one which applies to his next example, that of Oholiov, who was a credit to his father and his tribe.

388 Shemos 31, 6.

389 Sifra Emor, par. 14, 4. Thus, when Oholiov helped Betzalel construct the Tabernacle, his good work gained credit for himself, for his father and his tribe, who are also mentioned in the verse.

390 The verb {Hebrew Ref} is used, instead of sim or nosan to indicate that he was placed there alone, since it has this nuance (B.B.).

391 Rashi wishes to explain why it was that they were not placed together; the reason is that one does not place one guilty of a more heinous with one guilty of a less severe one (N.Y.).

392 Of the four modes of execution given to a Jewish court: stoning, burning (which is not "burning at the stake" which involves prolonged agony, and is against Jewish law), beheading with a sword and strangulation. The last did not involve hanging, as in done by non-Jews, but by having two cloths wrapped around the condemned person's neck, strangling him from both sides simultaneously (Sanhedrin 52b). Morever, before execution, the prisoner was drugged (Sanhedrin 43a). It should be borne in mind that the death penalty was hardly ever carried out; "a court which sentences a person to death [as often as] once in seventy years is called an injurious court" (Makkos 7b).

393 Bemidbor 15, 33.

394 In our verse.

395 Sifra Emor, par. 14, 5; Sanhedrin 78b. The question arises: how could he be condemned to death, inasmuch as he had not been given the proper hasro'oh, the proper warning, which should include an inkling that he will be condemned to death if he proceeds on the course of action he seems to be taking. How could he be given proper warning if the witnesses who warned him did not know what penalty faced him? This is all the more difficult according to R. Yehudoh, who holds that not only must he be notified that he will be liable to the death penalty if he carries out his intended action, but he must be told just which mode of execution he is letting himself in for. Many answers have been proposed for this. N.Y. suggests that this was a horo'as sho'oh, a decision meant to meet the circumstances of that particular time, and not according to the standard Halochoh; a court has that right. G.A. theorizes that the witnesses warned him that he was liable to whatever punishment G-d chose to mete out to him, and that was sufficient. B.B. points out that this incident occurred before Mattan Torah, and so warning was not required.

396 Who actually heard the blasphemous words, and not merely those who heard about the incident (B.Y.).

397 The word "all" as usual comes to include something or someone else.

398 Who have to hear from the witnesses exactly what the blasphemer said. The verse thus lists all those who are legally required to be involved with the sentence and execution (B.Y.). See Sifra Emor, per. 19, 1.

399 Sifra Emor, per. 19, 2. Why did the witnesses place their hands on the head of the blasphemer? D.H. explains that this was the very first execution carried out by a court, and the witnesses were reluctant to testify, since they considered it perhaps sinful to cause the death of another human being through their testimony; they were therefore instructed to place their hands on his head in order to demonstrate that he himself had caused his own death by his crime.

400 That is, though it is impossible that the entire congregation stone the blasphemer, and only a comparative handful did it, it is considered as though all had done so (L.B., see Sifra).

401 Death in one's fifties without surviving offspring.

402 Sanhedrin 56a. G-d's "titles" are non-specific Names by which He is known, such as {Hebrew Ref} , "Lord," {Hebrew Ref} , "Merciful" and the like.

403 In verse 11 Rashi explained the word {Hebrew Ref} , whose root is n-k-v, as "to pronounce clearly," and here he explains it as "to curse." M. points out that Radak in his dictionary noted that the root actually has both meanings: "to curse while pronouncing the Name distinctly." And that is why Rashi states (in his comments to verse 11): "that he clearly pronounced the Proper Name, and blasphemed." As Rashi notes here, in Bemidbor 23, 28 it has the meaning "to curse." And indeed, it also means "to pronounce clearly" in Bemidbor 1, 17, "Moshe and Aharon took these men whose names were clearly pronounced." Still, one might think that merely pronouncing the Proper Name of G-d might warrant the death penalty, and so the Sages point out that verse 14 make clear the reason for the blasphemer's execution: "Take the blasphemer...and the entire congregation shall stone him." He is stoned because of his blaspheming (cursing). Why then does the Torah change its terminology, and use two different words within the same paroshoh? Both actions were required to condemn him: he must curse, and while cursing, pronounce the Name clearly.

404 Bemidbor 23, 8; Sanhedrin 56a.

405 Shemos 21, 12.

406 Which includes women, who are not men, and minor children who are not (adult) men. Rashi cites this Midrosh in his comments to Shemos 21, 12, but here he shortens it somewhat, omitting the end, which points out that this excludes a minor who kills, since our verse begins: "Any man who kills." M.L. wonders why, since Rashi took the trouble to repeat the midrosh, why he did not quote it completely, but leaves the question unanswered. L.B. suggests that Rashi wanted only to reconcile the two verses here, without going into all the details.

407 Literally, "be placed in him."

408 That is, we appraise his worth as a slave before he was injured, and his worth now; the difference is the payment. There are also other payments required, for the time he is unable to work ( sheves), for the cost of the medical care required (rippui), for the pain (tza'ar) and the shame (boshes) (M.).

409 And therefore it refers to monetary compensation and not wounding the person who caused the injury in the same way he injured the plaintiff; Bovo Kammo 84a, Kesubos 32b.

410 Since verse 18 states: "Whoever smites an animal fatally," with the word nefesh, "soul" modifying "smites" while here the word nefesh does not appear (M.).

411 Literally, "is not said."

412 Since otherwise we do not exact the death penalty for a wound which is not fatal.

413 To pay compensation for the damage.

414 In this case, of course, he is liable to the death penalty.

415 In short, the fact that these two cases are juxtaposed means that we can compare them in both directions: just as a penalty is exacted for wounding a live animal, but not a dead one, so too with one's parents---one who strikes a parent's dead body and causes a laceration, G-d forbid, is not liable to the death penalty; on the other hand, just as one who strikes an animal without causing a wound is not liable for paying compensation, so one who strikes a parent when the parent is alive but does not cause a laceration is not liable to the death penalty, though of course he has violated a number of negative and positive commandments; Sifra Emor, per. 20, 8; Sanhedrin 84a-b.

416 Literally, "designate."

417 See Rashi on Shemos 19, 12, and see Rashi on Devorim 21, 22.

418 As is stated in Shemos 19, 13: "He will be stoned or cast down," which Rashi interprets as meaning: "From here we learn that those who are stoned are first pushed down from the stoning place from a height that is twice that of a man."

419 As stated in Shemos 19, 12: "for he will be stoned." If he dies from the fall, no further action is necessary, and he is stoned only until he dies; see Sanhedrin 45a-b.

420 As specified in Devorim 21, 22: "When a man is...executed, you shall hang him on a gallows [for just a moment]," regarding which Rashi notes: "Our Rabbis said [that] all those stoned are [then] hung." See Sifra Emor, per. 20, 10; Sanhedrin 45b, where the Rabbis hold that only blasphemers and idolators are subject to this debasement (M. on Devorim 21, 22, who explains that Rashi adopts a minority view, that of R. Eliezer, because it is closer to the plain meaning of the verse). Rashi's comment here comes to explain the expression "Bnei Yisroel did just as Ad-noy commanded Moshe," which cannot refer to the stoning alone, since that was already stated at the beginning of the verse. This clause must therefore refer to more than that (B.Y.).